What Children'Do in Spite of What They Know

Ab~tr:tct. New studies support th(' tr).'pnthesis that young children have baric cognitil'e capacities hilt utilize them inefficiently; older childrell aid the.fc capacities with generally valid cognitive heuri.rtics which produce poor performance on critical prohlem.r.
In a prcv;olls study of cognitive development we found that children of 2 years 6 months can successfully rec-' ognizc a numerical equality and its transformation into an inequality whereas older children temporarily lose this capacity. We interpreted our results as demonstrating that the capacity to con~erve relations between stimuli in the fac(~of transformations is present in the 2-year-old; the older child loses this capacity temporarily due to an overdcpendence on perceptual generalizations (for example. "if a row looks longer, it has more components in it"). This ihterprctation conflicts with the positir.1 that the ability to conserve numerical relations between stimuli first appears at ahout 5 to 6 years (I).
Bei!in--, critique of our previous study contains three general points: (i) ,nlr stlldy \\'a~not a direct test of the .::hild's capacity to conserve: (ii) his exp,'rimental evidence indicate<; that chilcir,~n up to 4 years R month~do not IInder<;tand the word "more" as a static relatil)nal term but as meaning Urn"re than it had ncforc": and (iii) his conservation cx reriments do not find any developmentaltrcnd during the :lrd and 4th year.
There can be no conflict regarding the facts of the child's hehavior since 'Beilin did not attempt to replicate our study: he neither studied children under age 3 nor did he present any of his subjects with the experimentai prohlem that we had used. However, since many otha psychologists have indicakd similar objections to our research. we shall concentrate primarily on the relevant theoretical aspects of Beilin's paper.
When a child discovers a particubr set of dimensions that stimuli can h'lve. he must then learn to interrelate those dimensions. For example. the capacitv to recognize a property like the Icn!!th of a row or the nllmber of ohjects in it does not itself aid the child in making correct judgmenl' about rdati..n, hetween rows. He must first discovcr !!cneral principles for the simultane"l1c omhination and .franSfl)r:l1ation l,f such properties. Pia!!et (2) h." suggested that the set of principles required to deal simultaneously with dimen,ions "f a particular cbs, are logically dl'~<.:riheJ as a group structure: each {!roup speci-1 fies an interrelated set of operations for tile combination and transformation of dimensions. The simultaneous present.e of all group operations is necessary for the child's cognition to he in ,I state of equilibrium with respect to those dimensions of his experience.
Piaget interprets the ability to conserve relations between stimuli in the face of superficial transformations as a behavioral sign of the presence of such an equilibrium in the child's thou~ht. For example, if the two stimuli (Table I) in (I a) are transformed to appear as in (I b), the child can realize that the numerical relation between SI :md S2 is the same in (lb) as in ( Ia) only if he knows (at least intuitively) that the shape transformation does not involve a change in number from the original relation. Similarly. in (1 c) and (I d) a child knows that the numerical relation between S3 and S4 is changed only if he can appreciate Ih,' fact that the nllmher transformation hetween (I c) and (I d) involves addition to one of the rows. Thus, cognitive mastery of the different dimensions of "hjects requin's knowledge of which transt.)fmatiol1s change a relation and which transformations conserve a relation. .
If these con~iderations are correct. tlwv place sever.1I requirements on any e\p;:rimental dem(ln~tration of the presence of the capacity for conservation. First. there must he a set of stimuli which hcar an initial relation to each othcr that the child is capablc of understanding. Second, there must' be at Icast one transformation applied to the initial set which changes one dimension of the stimulus. Third, the relation hetween the stimuli in the transformed sct should not be ohvious to the child independent of the initial relation [that is, the child must use the relational information presented in the initial sct or in the transformation (or in hoth) to solve the final prohlem]. Fourth, the child must have an unambiguous way of spontaneously indicating that hc understands the transformed relation.
The sequence (Ia)-( Ih) fulfills :111 these conditions for use with oldcr childrcn. They charactcristically indicatc that there is the same numher of oqjects in cach row in set (I h) because there is nothing done in the transformation from set (Ia) to change the actual quantity of SI. A surprisingly large numhcr of young children (Tahle 2A) maintain that the two rows in ( 1b) have the "same" number of clay balls in them. We felt that the young children might mean that the two rows in (1 b) are still individually the same rows as they were in (la); that is, that ider1tity of the rows was preserved hy the young child even though the relation between the rowS may not have been conserved. Support for :h:~inter-pretation is given by the fact that the young children perform less weU if they do not observe the transformation from (1 a) to (1 h) [although they stilI perform hettcr than older children (Table  2B) ]. Thus. for the 2-year-old, the sequence (I a) -( Ib) may not meet the fourth rcquirement on an experimental demonstration of conservation (3) .
Similarly. a study in which the transformation from (1 c) to (I d) was used indicates ihat the young child performs extremely well (T anle 3). However, this too might have been the result of the child's ahility to judge the relation in condition (t d) independently of the antecedent condition (t c): that is. in (1 d) the relative density of S I might be an independent perceptual cue for the young child. Thus. the sequence (1 c)-( Id) does not meet the third condition ahove (4).
Therefore. to overcome the experimental problems of working with children 2 years old, we combined the shape and number transformations and examined the child's reaction to the transformation of (Ie) --------which row had "more" halls in it. Although S5 is more dense than 56. it is also shorter: thus it is possible to argue that the third condition is met: there is no obvious perceptual basis for a correct decision in (I f) independent of (Ie) and the transformations. Thus. the young child's ability to perform correctly on this problem is a sign of the capacity to conserve. Howcvcr, we agree that this experimental paradigm is more complex than the usual tcst of conservation; it was nccessary in order to accommodate to the experimental difficulties associated with intcrviewing 2-year-old children (5). We felt confident that the young child does understand the word "more" as a relational term (so that the fourth condition was met), even though' he may not always understand "same" as a quantitative relational term. It is this belief that Beilin questions most strongly. His hypothesis is that our young Tahlc 2. Responses to (h) on cquality conservation sequence (la)-lIh\ of Tahle I (3). J)jf. ferent subjects were used in paradigm, A. R. and C. In paradiltm A subjccts saw the transformation: in B suhjects did not scc the transformation: in C subjects were forced to indicate one row as having "morc" (did not 'I';' the transformation). subjects systematically misunderstood the question about (1 f) and were answering that 51 had had "more added" to it. not that it had hmorc than" 52.
First, linguistic differences are not cxplanations of cognitive diffcrences but reflcct ions of them (2) . Second. although it might be true that the young child was using the addith'e interpretation of "more." therc arc several empirical considerations which invali~.lte this possibility. Reilin's data indie.lte that children do not start to undersiand the additivity interpretation of the word "more" until age 3 years 4 months. Yet children younger than this respond correctly to condition ( I f) whereas :he performance of older children is dramatically worsc. In addition. wc interviewed children from 2 years to 5 years on the same problem as in i le)-( I f) but these children did not ohserve us transforming (t e) into (If). [The stimuli used in (I e) and (1 f) were glued on prepared boards and presented in sequence.] Thus the subjects did not observe the activity of our adding more to 55 nor did they ohserve us compressing it. Despite the lack of additivity cues (or cues which might call attention to 55 as the manipulated row), the results confirm our earlier findings (Tahle 4).
Beilin scores a child as correct in all his tasks only if the child responds correctly on both the initial and the transformed set of stimuli. According to his own results on static judgments, under 65 percent of children correctly understood the initial relation in the equality paradigm and under 35 percent in the inequality paradigm. Thus, in Beilin's conservation paradigms, less than 50 percent of the children met even the first condition. If most of the children did not understand the relation, how can one assess their failure (or succcss) at conserving it?
In Beilin's static conservation tests of inequality (in which the child is asked to judge the numerical relation hetween two rows), children perform extremely poorly. This indicates that the child does not understand the relational term "morc" even at age 4 years 4 months to 4 years 7 months. If this were true, how could Beilin (or Piaget) maintain that the child at that age i<; nonconservin~of the equality (or inequality) relations presented in the initial set since he docs not understand the question? If Beilin were correct in the view that the child has not evcn started to interpret "more" as a relational term at :I!!e4 years 7 months, ------- Table 4 . Performance on (f) in sequence (le)- (1f) of Table I . Subjects did no.! observe the transformation.
it would be as much a problem for him and Piaget as for us.
There are several specific methodological techniques which may contribute to the extraordinarily low performance of Beilin's subjects at aU ages [even on such simple tasks a § the equality of the rows in (la) or the inequality in (I d)]. First, he asked children to make judgments on behalf of dolls; we found that asking children to make judgments on behalf of dolls as opposed to their own behalf often increases fluctuations in the responses (6).
[However, the same decrease in performance with age is observed in the children who made consistent judgments on which doll has "more" in (1f).] Second, Beilin used a fixed order of experimental paradigms across all children; we have found that the effects of experimental order are large; younger children quickly tire of such experiments (7). Finally, we are startled that Beilin did not usePiaget's methodology, which is characteristically adaptable to each particular subject. In particular, the importance of Beilin's data' (as well as the true performance of his subjects) would have been significantly enhanced if he had encouraged each child to understand the initial relation of each set, before testing the child's ability to conserve that relation under transformation.
Many structures and functional capacities are present in the cognition of the 2-year-old child. However, his ability to express these capacities is limited because memory and attention span are not well developed. As the 31 13 o child' accumulates experience, he develops cognitive heuristics which help him to overcome these basic behavioral limits. Although these cognitive heuristics are generally valid, they fail in critical instances, and eventually the child either rejects the heuristics or learns to use them only when they apply.
We agree with Beiiin that these theoretical claims are extremely strong and that a broad base of empirical support is necessary before they are accepted. In particular, our claim that the child of 3 performs less well on cognitive problems, owing to an overdependence on perceptual generalizations, must be explored with tasks other than judging the relative number of small rows of clay balls. We have studied similar decreases in performance with age in the long-term memory of figures, volume inequality, sentence comprehension, discrimination-learning, and other tasks (8).
Even more crucial is our hypothesis that the basic cognitive structures are available to the 2-year-old, but that he cannot utilize them efficiently. We certainly agree with the balance of nativism and empiricism in (Beilin's interpretation of) Piaget's view that: "(cognitive)
competencies reflect the influence of maturational and experiential determinants under the control of an internal self-regulating mechanism." It remains an empirical question, however, which component functions of human cognitive abilities are relatively autonomous, which emerge with experience as a catalytic agent, and which are learned primarily from experience (9). tive (Usame" or "more") in the question.
However, this effect was stronger for otder children and does not account for the hilZh performance of the young children. As in our previous experiment, the orientation of the sets of stimuli were randomized for each age group in all the experiments reported. All children were pretrained on the concept of a row with five small, stuffed animals arranged in a Hne, as an example. 4. Table 2C indicates that there is no tendency in the 2-year-old child to choose the more dense row as having "more" when the rows are numerically equal, as in (1b). The 3-vearold incorrectly judges the two rows in (ld) as the "same" number much more than the 2-year-old. This is additional evidence that the 3-year-old uses length as the basis for numerical judgments, whereas the 2-year-old does not. S. We had felt that the basis of our use of the term "conservation" in the absence of a classical test of conservation was clear in our previous paper. We apologize to any reader who was misled by our confusion. 6. We found that asking the young child if it would be "fair" if one dolI had Sl in (lb) and another doll had S2 was not satisfactory, since the young children seemed to think that anything was "fair" so long as each dolI had at least some balls to play with. 7. In our studies, children below age 4 have some tendency to change their answers when asked the same kind of question more than once: we think that this results from the child's assumption that being asked a second time indicates that his first answer was incorrect. Some of the children in our first study were also asked to choose on behalf of dolls which row in (If) has "more. 
. 9. In response to Beilin's reply to this paper:
(i) The (1e) to (If) transformation is a test of the "capacity" to conserve, not merely a "control condition." (if) The young child does not have a general strategy of choosing the denser row as having "more" (see footnote (4) and Table 2C ). (Iii) Failures to replicate our findings on the (I a) to (lb) transformation (Table 2 , A and B) must be examined for similarity of technique and scoring. (iv) We are indebted to Beilin for pointing out a gap in this report: less than 5 percent of our subjects failed to a~ree on the initial equality of (la), (lc), or (Ie) (after discussion in some cases), and most of those were over 3 years old. Therefore our data were not significantly "inflated by including children who are incorrect in their initial judgments and correct in the tran~formatjon re~oonse," white Beilin's data appear to be significantly "deflated" by including: such children as unonconservers." This remains the heart of our critique of Beilin's data analysis: if a child does not understalrd the initial relation (whether spontaneously or after discussion), how can he be exoected to "conserve" that relation under 
